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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBERT F. BENNION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, 
COUNTY COMMISSION, UTAH COUNTY 
PLANNING COMMISSION, JEFFREY R. 
MENDENHALL, COUNTY ZONING 
ADMINISTRATION, SUNDANCE DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation, 
SUNDANCE VILLAGE COTTAGES, LTD., a 
UTAH CORPORATION, CHARLES ROBERT 
REDFORD, C. CRAIG LILJENQUIST, KAY 
BRYSON, Utah County Attorney, GUY R. 
BURNINGHAM, Deputy Utah County 
Attorney and Civil Division Chief, 
JERIL B. WILSON, Deputy Utah County 
Attorney, E. KENT SUNDBERG, Deputy 
Utah County Attorney, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
I. JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a dismissal by the Fourth District 
Court, Utah County, State of Utah of Appellant's action. The Court 
of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Coded Annotated 
Section 78-2-2(3)(j). 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
a. Whether appellant exhausted his administrative remedies 
prior to bringing this action. 
Case No. 
920628-CA 
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Standard of Review 
Questions of whether a party has failed to comply 
with the requirements of a statute and the rules of civil 
procedure sufficient to justify dismissal are questions 
of law, and on appeal, we accord no particular deference 
to the determinations of law made by the trial court but 
review them for correctness. Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 
20,22 (Utah 1990). 
In Arrow Indus, vs. Zions First Nat. Bank, 767 P.2d 935 (Utah 
1988), the court held that: 
A motion to dismiss is only appropriate where it appears 
to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled 
to relief under any state of facts which could be proved 
in support of its claim. In reviewing an order granting 
a motion to dismiss, we are obliged to construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff 
and to indulge all reasonable inferences in its favor. 
Arrow Indus., 767 P.2d at 936. 
b. Whether appellant must comply with the Governmental 
Immunity Act when bringing an action for vacation and appeal of a 
Board of Adjustment ruling. 
Questions of whether a party has failed to comply 
with the requirements of a statute and the rules of civil 
procedure sufficient to justify dismissal are questions 
of law, and on appeal, we accord no particular deference 
to the determinations of law made by the trial court but 
review them for correctness. Avila v. Winn, 794 P. 2d 
20,22 (Utah 1990). 
III. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
a. U.C.A. Section 17-5-2: 
Each member of the board of county commissioners
 { 
shall be an elector of the county which he 
represents and must have been such for at least one 
year immediately preceding his election, and he 
shall be elected by the qualified electors of the 
county at large. 
i 
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b. U.C.A. Section 17-27-23 (1991): 
Violation of Chapter 27, Title 17, or of any 
adopted county zoning, subdivision, or official map 
ordinance is punishable as a class C misdemeanor. 
The Board of County Commissioners, the County 
Attorney or any owner of real estate within the 
county in which such violation occurs, may, in 
addition to other remedies provided by law, 
institute injunction, mandamus, abatement or any 
other appropriate action or proceedings to prevent, 
enjoin, abate, or remove the unlawful building, use 
or act. (Underline added) 
c. U.C.A. Section 63-30-1 et seq. (See Addendum 1) 
d. U.C.A. Section 63-30-2(1) (Governmental Immunity Act) 
(See Addendum 1) 
e. U.C.A. Section 63-30-5 (See Addendum 1) 
f. U.C.A. Section 63-30-6 (See Addendum 1) 
g. U.C.A. Sections 63-30-8, thru 10 (See Addendum 1) 
h. U.C.A. Section 63-30-11 (See Addendum 1) 
i. U.C.A. Section 63-30-12 (See Addendum 1) 
j. U.C.A. Section 63-30-13 (See Addendum 1) 
k. U.C.A. Section 63-30-14 (See Addendum 1) 
1. U.C.A. Section 63-30-15 (See Addendum 1) 
m. U.C.A. Section 63-30-19 (See Addendum 1) 
n. U.C.A. Section 78-33-1 et seq. (Declaratory Judgment Act) 
(See Addendum 2) 
o. U.C.A. Section 78-33-2: 
Any person interested under a deed, will or written 
contract, or whose rights, status or other legal 
relations are effected by a statute, municipal 
ordinance, contract or franchise, may have 
determined any question of construction or validity 
arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, 
contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of 
rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. 
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p. U.C.Z.O. Section 2-2 B 1: 
B. LIST OF DEFINITIONS 
1. Administrative Agency 
The Utah County Planning Department, excluding the 
appointed Planning Commission. 
q. U.C.Z.O, Section 2-2 B 2: 
B. LIST OF DEFINITIONS 
2. Administrative Officer 
The Planning Director, the Zoning Administrator, or any 
of their duly appoint designees. 
r. U.C.Z.O. Section 7-15: 
APPEALS TO THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT 
Any person, organization, corporation, or unit or 
department of government which has been aggrieved 
by a decision allegedly made in error by an 
administrative officer or agency; or requesting an 
interpretation of the zoning map; or wishing to 
make an appeal for a special exception or variance; 
may do so by filing a formal request in writing 
with the Zoning Administrator. The application 
shall be accepted by the Zoning Administrator only 
if accompanied by a non-refundable fee of the 
current amount as set by the Legislative Body, and 
if the application form has been properly filed 
within forty-five (45) days after the contested 
action of the administrative officer or agency. The 
application requesting to appear before the Board 
of Adjustment shall be made on forms furnished by 
the Zoning Administrator at least fifteen (15) days 
prior to the date of the hearing of the appeal. 
4 
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s. U.C.Z.O. Section 7-24: 
Any person or persons, jointly or severely, 
aggrieved by any action of the Board of Adjustment, 
or any tax payer, or any office, department, board, 
or agency of the county, may have and maintain a 
plenary action for relief therefrom in any court of 
record to having competent jurisdiction, provided 
that petition for such relief is presented to the 
court within thirty (30) days after the filing of 
such decision in the office of the Board of 
Adjustment. Unless such petition for relief is 
presented to the court within said thirty (30) 
days, a decision of the Board of Adjustment shall 
be final. No decision of the Board of Adjustment 
shall be subject to rehearing, except when remanded 
from a county (SIC) of competent jurisdiction. 
t. U.C.Z.O. Section 7-29: 
Any person, firm, corporation, or other entity 
violating any one of the provisions of this 
ordinance shall be guilty of a Class ffC" 
misdemeanor for each such offense. The Board of 
County Commissioners, the County Attorney, or any 
owner of real estate within the county in which 
such a violation occurs, may, in addition to other 
remedies provided by law, institute injunction, 
mandamus, abatement, or any other appropriate 
action or proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or 
remove the unlawful building, use, or act. 
u. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 14: (See 
Addendum 3). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Appellant is a tax payer and owner of real property 
in Utah County. He has objected on numerous occasions to special 
treatment which has been accorded to Sundance Development 
Corporation by the administrative agencies and legislative body of 
Utah County. 
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Plaintiff-Appellant has brought no monetary claim which would 
fall within the purview of the Governmental Immunity Act, nor has 
he brought a claim for damages against the municipal bodies of Utah 
County. He brought this action timely to the District Court to 
appeal of a Board of Adjustment decision and has no further 
administrative remedy available to him. He brought an action to 
have a Plat which had been approved by the Board of County 
Commissioners and the Planning Commission vacated as well as 
building permits issues thereunder. 
This trial court ruled as a matter of law that plaintiff had 
failed to exhaust his administrative remedy and that he was 
required to comply with the Governmental Immunity Act in bringing 
an action for vacation. i 
FACTS 
1. Appellant is the owner of real property located in Utah 
County, State of Utah. (R at 87) 
2. On December 5, 1991, the Board of Adjustment for Utah 
County ruled that: 
a. It had no authority to review the actions of the 
Zoning Administrator regarding zoning decisions; 
b. Appeals from the Planning Commission should go 
directly to the court, not to the coequal Board of Adjustment with 
which it has partially common membership; and 
c. Permit 8663 be corrected to have the ownership 
changed to the proper entity. (R at 34) 
6 
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3. Pursuant to statute, appeal to the district court was 
brought within thirty (30) days and Complaint herein was filed on 
or about January 2, 1992, (R at 2) 
4. Appellant sought the following relief with the district 
court: 
a. Abatement of building Permit 8780; 
b. Declaration of rights of appellant with regard to 
appeals to the Board of Adjustment of actions of the Zoning 
Administrator; 
c. Declaration of rights with regard to Permit 8663 and 
the original and sole jurisdiction of the Utah County Board of 
Adjustment to grant and hear variances; 
d. Abatement of Plat "A" Amended [5] of the Sundance 
Recreational Resort; and 
e. Compliance with the zoning ordinance by county 
officials and agencies. (R at 7-8) 
5. Parties included county agencies, county officials, 
private individuals and a public corporation. (R at 13) 
6. Sundance Recreational Resort Plat "A" Amended [5], (the 
Plat), was approved by the Board of County Commissioners of Utah 
County. (R at 8) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I 
This action was dismissed for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies and failure to comply with the Utah 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Governmental Immunity Act. Appellant followed the procedural 
requirements in making an appeal to the Board of Adjustment and 
then bringing an appeal to the district court when his appeal 
before the Board of Adjustment was denied. The Board of Adjustment 
denied Appeal 1052, that it had no holding jurisdiction to review 
his claim. Because the Board of Adjustment denies jurisdiction to 
review Building Permits, abatement of Permit 8780 was sought 
directly. As part of this appeal, plaintiff seeks declaration of 
rights and determination with regard to those actions which the 
Board of Adjustment has stated it has no jurisdiction to hear. 
In addition the above, Appellant has brought an action to 
abate a Plat for which no administrative appeal process existed at 
the time this action was brought. Statutory and other requirements 
for exhaustion of administrative remedies having been met, there 
were no grounds for dismissal. It must therefore be set aside. 
II 
Appellant brought this action under authority of Utah Code 
Annotated Section 78-33-2 for declaration of individual rights as 
to which actions may be brought before the Board of Adjustment, as 
well as Utah Code Annotated Section 17-27-23 for abatement of a 
plat and building permit. Appeal from denials by the Board of 
Adjustment must be filed within thirty (30) days of such denial. No 
other requirements were mandated by the statute with regard to 
undertakings, notice or any other procedures. There neither is nor 
was a statutory requirement that provisions of the Governmental 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Immunity Act be observed when taking an appeal from a decision by 
the Board of Adjustment. 
The Governmental Immunity Act serves the dual purposes of 
waiving stated and municipal immunity from monetary claims due to 
negligence and standardizing procedures for bringing claims for 
money or damages under negligence, property or contract actions. 
Because the Governmental Immunity Act does not apply to plaintiff, 
dismissal was improper. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Sundance Development Corporation is the primary owner of a 
recreational resort located in Northfork Canyon of the Provo River 
behind Mount Timpanogos. (R at 11) As such, it is subject to the 
Utah County Zoning Ordinance and specifically to the provisions of 
the recreational resorts, chapter 6-5. In the summer of 1991, 
Sundance Development Corporation began construction on sewer lines 
and moving stream beds without a permit or permission from the 
Board of County Commissioners. Neither were all improvements 
located on the Plat or approved by the Board of County 
Commissioners. (R at 8) 
Appellant brought the failure of Defendant Sundance 
Development Corporation to obtain proper permits and approvals 
prior to beginning construction to the attention of the Utah County 
Planning Department, the Planning Commission and the Utah County 
Board of County Commissioners. No action was taken with regard to 
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Sundance Development Corporation's failure to comply with the 
zoning ordinance other than to issue building permits to cover 
ongoing and complete work. Sundance Development Corporation then 
proceeded to seek approval of a new plat, Sundance Recreational 
Resort Plat "A" Amended [5] (the Plat). It was approved by the 
Board of County Commissioners and Planning Commission on or about 
October 16, 1991. Building Permit 8663 was issued to legitimize 
several improvements complained of by Appellant. No variance was 
issued regarding Permit 8663 although the improvements materially 
violated the Utah County Zoning Ordinance. (R at 4) Following 
issuance of Permit 8663, appellant timely appealed this act to the 
Board of Adjustment of Utah County to have the building permit 
issued by the Planning Department vacated for failure to apply for 
variance prior to application for the building permit. (R at 34) On 
December 5, 1991, the Board of Adjustment entered the following 
denial of appeal. 
That the Board of Adjustment deny the appeal application 
that an error was made by the Zoning Administrative, 
based on the following findings: (1) the Zoning 
Administrative acted under the direction of the Planning 
Commission and therefore cannot be acted upon by the 
Board. (2) Appeals from decisions of the Planning 
Commission should go directly to the court, not to the 
co-equal Board of Adjustment which has partially common 
membership. (3) Permit 8663 to be corrected to have the 
ownership changed to have the proper entity. (R at 34) 
Aside from the sel f-contradictory actions of the Board of 
Adjustment which state that they cannot act upon Appeal 8663 
because it calls into question the actions of the Zoning 
Administrator and at the same times directs that Permit 8663 have 
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the ownership information corrected by the thereon, presumably same 
Zoning Administrator, the effect of the actions of the Board of 
Adjustment was to deny its statutory-jurisdiction to grant or deny 
variances for building permits. 
Appellant then timely filed this action to appeal the denial 
of Appeal 1052 by the Board of Adjustment. (R at 2) Because the 
refusal to exercise jurisdiction by the Board of Adjustment was 
decided under a "statute [or] municipal ordinance", appellant 
brought a declaratory rights action under Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-33-2. Appellant also brought, pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated Section 17-27-23, an action to abate the Plat to the 
extent that it violates the Utah County Zoning Ordinance and to 
abate building Permits 8780 and 8663 which are both based upon the 
Flat. (R at 8-13) On May 13, 1992, the trial court entered the 
following rule dismissing appellant's action: 
The court hereby grants defendants' motion. Plaintiff has 
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to 
instigating this legal action. He must first appeal his 
grievance to the Utah County Board of Adjustments. In 
addition, even if plaintiff did not need to exhaust 
administrative remedies before seeking legal redress, he 
has failed to comply with the requirements of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Annotated Section 
63-30-1 et seq. (R at 96) 
After appellant's Motion for New Trial was denied, appellant 
timely brought this appeal. (R at 137) In Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 
20,22 (Utah 1990) the court held that " 
Questions of whether a party has failed to comply 
with the requirements of a statute and the rules of civil 
procedure sufficient to justify dismissal are question of 
law, and on appeal, we accord no particular deference to 
the determinations of law made by the trial court but 
review them for correctness. Avila, 794 P.2d at 22. 
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In as much as this appeal is based upon a dismissal for 
failure to comply with rules of procedure and statutes, the court 
is presented with a question of law. The trial court's decision 
must therefore be granted no particular deference. 
In determining which facts to rely upon in an appeal from 
dismissal, in Arrow Indus, vs. Zions First Nat. Bank, 767 P. 2d 935 
(Utah 1988), the court held that: 
A motion to dismiss is only appropriate where it appears 
to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled 
to relief under any state of facts which could be proved 
in support of its claim. In reviewing an order granting 
a motion to dismiss, we are obliged to construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff 
and to indulge all reasonable inferences in its favor. 
Arrow Indus., 767 P.2d at 936. 
The facts must therefore be viewed in the light most favorable 
to Appellant. 
POINT II 
A. Administrative Remedies With Regard To Appeal No. 1052 
Were Exhausted. 
The primary basis for dismissal of this action was failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies. (R at 96) . This Ruling, however, 
is contrary to the facts and is without any basis. Appellant 
brought Appeal No. 1052 before the Board of Adjustment of Utah 
County pursuant to the Utah County Zoning Ordinance and within the 
time limits therein regarding Building Permit 8663. On December 5, 
1991, the Board of Adjustment denied Appeal No. 1052. (R at 34) 
Utah County Zoning Ordinance Section 7-24 RECOURSE FROM ACTIONS 
TAKEN BY THE BOARD, provides as follows: 
12 
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Any person or persons, jointly or severely, aggrieved by 
any action of the Board of Adjustment, or any tax payer, 
or any office, department, board, or agency of the 
county, may have and maintain a plenary action for relief 
therefrom in any court of record to having competent 
jurisdiction, provided that petition for such relief is 
presented to the court within thirty (30) days after the 
filing of such decision in the office of the Board of 
Adjustment. Unless such petition for relief is presented 
to the court within said thirty (30) days, a decision of 
the Board of Adjustment shall be final. No decision of 
the Board of Adjustment shall be subject to rehearing, 
except when remanded from a county (SIC) of competent 
jurisdiction. 
An appeal to the District Court is the only remedy available 
after denial of appeal by the Board of Adjustment. Appellant then 
filed this action January 2, 1992, which was within thirty (30) 
days of the denial of Appeal 1052. (R at 2) Appellant has therefore 
complied with all requirements of the statute and zoning ordinance 
and has exhausted his administrative remedies in seeking to have an 
action of the Zoning Administrator and the issuance of a building 
permit set aside. Dismissal was therefore improper regarding Appeal 
1052. 
B. Administrative Remedies Were Exhausted With Regard To The Plat 
As part of this action, appellant sought to have Sundance 
Recreational Resort Plat "A" Amended [5] abated. (R at 8) The Plat 
was approved by the Utah County Commission. Utah County Zoning 
Ordinance Section 7-15 provides as follows:
 ( 
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APPEALS TO THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT 
Any person, organization, corporation, or unit or 
department of government which has been aggrieved by a 
decision allegedly made in error by an administrative 
officer or agency; or requesting an interpretation of the 
zoning map; or wishing to make an appeal for a special 
exception or variance; may do so by filing a formal 
request in writing with the Zoning Administrator. The 
application shall be accepted by the Zoning Administrator 
only if accompanied by a non-refundable fee of the 
current amount as set by the Legislative Body, and if the 
application form has been properly filed within forty-
five (45) days after the contested action of the 
administrative officer or agency. The application 
requesting to appear before the Board of Adjustment shall 
be made on forms furnished by the Zoning Administrator at 
least fifteen (15) days prior to the date of the hearing 
of the appeal. 
The Board of Adjustment can only hear appeals from "a decision 
allegedly made in error by an administrative office of agency; or 
requesting an interpretation of the zoning map; or wishing to make 
an appeal for a special exception or variance." Utah County Zoning 
Ordinance Section 2-2 B 1 defines administrative agency as "the 
Utah County Planning Department, excluding the appointed Planning 
Commission". Utah County Zoning Ordinance Section 2-2 B 2 defines 
administrative officer as "the Planning Director, the Zoning 
Administrator or any of their duly appointed designees." The only 
appeals, therefore, that can be heard by the Board of Adjustment 
are from acts by the Planning Department or the Planning Director, 
the Zoning Administrator or appointed designees of them. No appeal 
may be had from an act by either the Planning Commission, which is 
expressly not an administrative agency, or the Board of County 
Commissioners, which is an elected body, and not a part of the 
14 
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Planning Department U.C.A. 17-5-2. The Plat was recommended for 
approval by the Planning Commission and it was approved by the 
Board of County Commissioners for Utah County. (R at 6) There was 
no provision for review of plats approved by the Board of County 
Commissioners at the time this action was brought, and the 
administrative remedies regarding the Plat were exhausted therefore 
by appellant prior to the filing of this action on January 2, 1992. 
Appellant having exhausted his administrative remedies with regard 
to the Flat, dismissal was improper. 
C. Appeal of Building Permit 8780 is excused for futility. 
Appellant also brought Building Permit 8780 for abatement as 
part of this action. Appellant does not dispute that he did not 
appeal the issuance of Building Permit 8780 to the Board of 
Adjustment, but claims that such an act would have been useless and 
therefore unnecessary. 
As part of its ruling denying Appeal 1052, the Board of 
Adjustment stated that it did not have jurisdiction to review 
building permits issued by the Zoning Administrator. (R at 34) The 
Board of Adjustment held that "the Zoning Administrator acted under 
the direction the Planning commission and therefor (SIC) can not be 
acted upon by the Board." (R at id) As Building Permit 8780 arose 
under exactly the same type of circumstances, appellant could only 
expect to have a denial based upon lack of jurisdiction entered by 
the Board of Adjustment. The courts in Utah have long recognized 
that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has an 
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important exception; that is, that no useless act will be required. 
A party will not be required to waste time and resources if the end 
result is a foregone conclusion. See In Re: Tanner, 549 P.2d 703 
(Utah 1976); and State Tax Commission vs. Verson, 782 P. 2d 519 
(Utah 1989). 
Because the Utah County Board of Adjustment ruled itself to be 
without jurisdiction to hear Appeal 1052 regarding Building Permit 
8663 (R at id), it was very unlikely to find itself with 
jurisdiction to review Building Permit 8780. It would have been a 
waste of appellant's money and time to pay the filing fee, prepare 
the appeal, attend the Board of Adjustment's meeting, present his 
case, and then be denied for lack of jurisdiction. Dismissal was 
therefore improper with regard to Permit 8780 also. 
POINT III 
A. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act Does Not Apply To This 
Action. 
The trial court dismissed this action by also relying on the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Chapter 30 of Title 63 of the Utah 
Code. (R at 96) However, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the 
Act) is limited in scope and only applies to certain types of 
actions. Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-2(1) defines a claim as: 
"Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or 
damages against a governmental entity or against an 
employee.(Underline added) 
Only money or damage claims are controlled by the Act. The Act 
then lists numerous procedural requirements for bringing a claim. 
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Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-11 sets out the notice 
requirements with regard to information to be provided to the 
government on claims. Sections 63-30-12 and 63-30-13 establish the 
time limits for bringing a claim against either the State or a 
political subdivision thereof. Section 63-30-14 provides that a 
notice within ninety (90) days will be given as to approval or 
denial of the claim the from which runs a separate one (1) year 
time period in which a "claim" may be brought under U.C.A. Section 
63-30-15. Section 63-30-13 also requires an undertaking to be 
provided. The key to all these procedural bars upon which the 
District Court dismissed this action is the word "claim". Utah Code 
Annotated Section 63-30-11 is limited to: 
(1) "CLAIM" arises when the statute of limitations that 
would apply if the claim were against a private person 
beings to run. 
(2) Any person having a "CLAIM" for injury... 
U.C.A. 63-30-12 is limited to "[A] "CLAIM* against the 
state..." U.C.A. 63-30-13 is limited to "[A] "CLAIM* against a 
political subdivision..." U.C.A. 63-30-14 limits itself to 'Within 
ninety days of the filing of a "CLAIM'..." U.C.A. 63-30-15 only 
discusses whether "the CLAIM" is denied. U.C.A. 63-30-19 refers to 
actions brought under this chapter. From a review of the intended 
breath of this chapter by the word claim, and the limitation of all 
of the procedures to claims which are "for money or damages", 
application of the Act to this action was improper. 
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Statutes are examined as a whole (Schurtz v. BMW of North 
America, Inc. , 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991)), the whole 
legislative scheme, as it exists, must be compared to Appellant's 
action. The body of the Act only refers to money and damage 
actions. U.C.A. Section 63-30-5 waives immunity for contractual 
obligations, and expressly waives procedural claim requirements as 
identified above. U.C.A. Sections 63-30-6 and 10.5 waive immunity 
regarding real and personal property ownership. U.C.A. Sections 63-
30-8 thru 10 waive immunity regarding injury due to negligence. 
Appellant, however, has brought no action for either money or 
damages against a political subdivision of the State or the State 
of Utah. Appellant's prayer for relief requests only the following: 
1. Abatement of Building Permit 8780; 
2. Declaration of rights of appellant with regard to appeal 
to the Board of Adjustment of actions by the Zoning Administrator; 
3. Declaration of rights with regard to Permit 8663 and the 
originals and that the Utah County Board of Adjustment has original 
sole jurisdiction to grant and hear variances; 
4. Abatement of the plat; and 
5. That the Utah County officials and agencies be ordered to 
comply with the Zoning Ordinance. (R at 7-8) 
Because none of Appellant's requests are for damages or for 
money, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act does not apply to this 
action. 
18 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
B. Appellant Has Brought This Action As A Private Attorney 
General. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 17-27-23 (1991) provides the 
following authority for bringing an action for violation of the 
Zoning Ordinance: 
Violation of Chapter 27, Title 17, or of any adopted 
county zoning, subdivision, or official map ordinance is 
punishable as a class C misdemeanor. The Board of County 
Commissioners, the County Attorney or any owner of real 
estate within the county in which such violation occurs, 
may, in addition to other remedies provided by law, 
institute injunction, mandamus, abatement or any other 
appropriate action or proceedings to prevent, enjoin, 
abate, or remove the unlawful building, use or act. 
(Underline added) 
Appellant is the owner of real property located in Utah 
County, State of Utah. (R at 87) The legislature granted authority 
to owners of real property to act in the same capacity as the 
County Attorney and therefore to act as private attorneys general 
with regard to enforcement of zoning ordinances. There is no 
reference herein to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. However, 
there is a broad grant of power to "institute injunction, mandamus, 
abatements or any other appropriate action or proceedings"... Utah 
County Zoning Ordinance Section 7-29 granted owners of real 
property the same right under the Zoning Ordinance. 
Appellant, as a private attorney general, has sought to abate 
Building Permit 8780, abate the Plat, and seeks mandamus whereby 
the County officials and agencies are ordered to comply with the 
Zoning Ordinance and enforcement thereof. (R at 7-8) Since a clear 
statutory grant of equitable power has been made by the 
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legislature, as well as a grant of the power of private attorney 
general to protect the equitable value of an individual's property 
from improper acts by any individual, to include County officials 
and County agencies, the only explicit legislatively imposed limits 
must be met to exercise this right. The trial court has sought to 
abridge this grant of authority to the owners of real property by 
engrafting the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
onto this section. (R at S6) 
The trial court has implicitly interpreted the statutes in 
question to include the Governmental Immunity Act by reference. In 
reviewing interpretation of statutes by the trial court, a no 
deference is granted to the trial court and a "correction of error*' 
standard is used. See Ketchum, Konkel, et al v. Heritage Mtn, 784 
P.2d 1217,1220 (Utah App. 1989). 
In Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111 (Utah 1991), the court held 
that: 
The primary rule of statutory construction is to give 
effect to the intent of the legislature in light of the 
purpose of the statute was meant to achieve. Reeves, 813 
P.2d at 115. 
Applying that rule to the Governmental Immunity Act, the 
statute sets out orderly provisions for the processing and review 
of money and damage claims. It is not ambiguous, and is limited to 
this purpose. 
The Declaratory Judgment Act, U.C.A. 78-33-1 et seq is for the 
equitable determination of rights under statute. U.C.A. 17-27-23 
grants authority to landowners the power to act as attorneys 
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general on an equal footing with the county attorney. The 
legislative purpose of both of these statutes is to allow 
individuals to protect their rights, either by a declaratory 
judgment action regarding personal obligations and rights, U.C.A. 
78-33-2, or to protect equitable real property interests, U.C.A. 
17-27-23. These statutes and the Governmental Immunity Act have 
only one thing in common, the state may be a defendant. 
In as much as the major purposes of these statutes are 
distinct and separate, engrafting the claims control requirements 
on these rights statutes is improper. 
C. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act Does Not Apply To Appeals. 
The court did not state upon what grounds it was including the 
requirement that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act be applied to 
appeals from the Board of Adjustment. However, a review Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure Rule 14 provides in material part that: 
[A] Petition for review shall be filed with the clerk of 
teh appellate court within the time prescribed by 
statute, or if there is no time prescribed, then within 
30 days after the date of the written decision or order. 
The court, by its Rules of Appellate Procedure, does not 
require that appeals from orders and decisions of administrative 
bodies be subject to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The 
default for appeal of thirty (30) days indicates that no ninety 
(30) day limit and notice requirement exists. 
The reason for this is obvious. An administrative agency, in 
this action, the Utah County Board of Adjustment, has been aware 
for a significant period of time of the basis of the potential 
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action, as well as having had all of the facts argued before it. (R 
at 34) Giving it an additional ninety (90) days within which to 
decide whether or not there is a valid claim, after it has issued 
a formal decision, would be to allow it to reverse its decisions in 
an informal appellate procedure which is not provided for either by 
statute or ordinance. It would not be fair to a party adversely 
effected by a reversal of the decision in private, and would 
therefore be a violation of due process rights. 
Because the administrative agency is well aware of the basis 
of the action, there being no money or other damages sought (R at 
7-8), and that granting an agency an additional ninety (90) days 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-14 to review and 
perhaps change its decision would serve no permissible purpose, it 
is simply illogical to engraft the Act onto appeals from the 
decisions of administrative agencies. 
D. The Act Does Not Apply To Declaratory Judgment Actions 
Appellant brought his Complaint partially in the nature of a 
declaratory judgment action, U.C.A.Section 78-33-1 et seq 
(Declaratory Judgment Act). (R at 7-8) Utah Code Annotated Section 
78-33-2 provides as follows: 
Any person interested under a deed, will or written 
contract, or whose rights, status or other legal 
relations are effected by a statute, municipal ordinance, 
contract or franchise, may have determined any question 
of construction or validity arising under the instrument, 
statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a 
declaration of rights, status or other legal relations 
thereunder. 
Appellant, as an owner of real property in Utah County, wished 
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to know whether the Board of Adjustment will hear his appeals 
regarding improper issuance of building permits, or whether such 
action should be brought only in the District Court. (R at 7-8,13) 
Appellant has been told by the Board of Adjustment that he can only 
bring the action in the District Court. (R at 34) Appellant has 
also been told by the District Court that he cannot bring the 
action in the District Court. (R at 96) The District Court has 
engrafted the Utah Governmental Immunity Act onto the Declaratory 
Judgments Act as an additional requirement for having an equitable 
decision reached regarding his available rights. 
In American Tierra v. City of West Jordan, 186 Utah Advance 
Report 3 (Utah 1992), the court held that: 
This court long has recognized a common law exception to 
governmental immunity for equitable claims. American 
Tierra, 186 Utah Advance Report at 4. 
Declaratory Judgment actions are equitable in nature as they 
are solely to determine relationships and are not necessarily for 
"money or damages". Dismissal was therefore improper in as much as 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act does not apply to equitable 
actions such as has been brought by appellant. 
E. This Action Was Brought Under Separate Statutory Authority 
Finally, Appellant points out the fact that each of his claims 
was brought under an express grant of authority not contained 
within the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. His declaratory judgment 
action was brought under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-33-1. His 
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abatement action was brought under Utah Code Annotated Section 17-
27-23 (1331). Appellant's appeal from denial of Appeal 1052 by the 
Utah County Board of Adjustment was brought under Utah County 
Zoning Ordinance Section 7-24. 
In Adkins vs. Division of State Land, 713 P.2d 524 (Utah 
1586), the trial court dismissed plaintiff's action for failure to 
comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Plaintiff had 
brought his action under a separate statute, and had failed to meet 
the requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act as a result. 
The court held that: 
We believe that court's reliance upon the Government 
Immunity Act was misplaced...We find nothing in the 
Immunity Act which indicates that the legislature 
intended to impose the requirement of filing a claim with 
the Attorney General when the claimant was pursuing a 
dispute which by statute had been made cognissable by an 
administrative body. This view is consistent with our 
decision in Archer v. Utah State Land Board, 15 Utah 2d 
321, 336 P.2d 622 (1364) where he held that governmental 
immunity was not a defense for a writ of mandamus to 
compel the defendant Land Board to comply with its 
statutory duty to issue and oil and gas lease to the 
plaintiff. In that case, we distinguished Wilkinson v. 
State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P 626 (1313) where we held that 
governmental immunity barred an action for damage against 
the State caused by waters escaping from a canal owned 
and controlled by the Board Land Commissioners. 
Section 65-1-3(2) expressly authorized judicial review of 
decision of the "board". We find no persuasive reason why 
we should engraft upon that subsection the requirement of 
filing and undertaking as required by Section 63-30-13, 
which applies to the filing of actions on claims against 
he State where immunity once existed but which has been 
expressly waived by the Governmental Immunity Act. That 
is not the situation in the instant case where we are 
dealing with an appeal from an administrative agency to 
the courts as authorized by statute. Adkins, 713 P.2d at 
525-526. (Italics in original) 
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The trial court has sought to engraft unauthorized road blocks 
and procedural difficulties onto specific grants of statutory 
authority which are available to appellant. This engraftment has 
caused appellant unnecessary and undue delay and expense in the 
vindication of his rights. The dismissal should therefore be set 
aside as contrary to established State law, 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court dismissed this action for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies and for failure to comply with the 
Governmental Immunity Act. The administrative remedies were 
exhausted with regard to Building Permit 8663 under Appeal 1052 and 
the Plat. It would be an act of futility to have appealed to the 
Board of Adjustment Building Permit 8780 in as much as the Board of 
Adjustment declined jurisdiction to hear the issue with regard to 
Appeal 1052. As useless acts are not required prior to appeal, 
appeal of Building Permit 8780 is therefore proper. Dismissal on 
this ground is therefore improper. 
There is no basis for the application of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act to the present action. Appellant is not seeking either 
money or damages. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, by its terms, 
only applies to actions for money or damages. In addition, 
appellant is seeking relief under separate statutory grant which 
does not expressly include the Governmental Immunity Act and is 
contrary to establish State law under Adkins. Appellant also seeks 
equitable remedies which are traditionally not required to conform 
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to the Governmental Immunity Act Guidelines. Finally, appeal from 
denial of Appeal 1052 before the Board of Adjustment is an appeal 
from the ruling of an administrative body, and therefore not under 
the jurisdiction and guidelines of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
In as much as dismissal has no basis in law, it should 
therefore be set aside and^jjew trial granted. 
DATED thisc23day of c L S ^ d e ^ J ^ , 19S2. 
RICHARD C. COXSOJ 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
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63-30-1 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 654* 
Section 
63-30-26. Reserve funds for payment of claims 
or purchase of insurance created by 
political subdivisions. 
63-30-27. Tax levy by political subdivisions for 
payment of claims, judgments, or in-
surance premiums. 
63-30-28. Liability insurance — Purchase of in-
surance or self-insurance by govern-
.,..,; mental entity authorized — Estab-
lishment of trust accounts for self-
insurance. 
63-30-29. Repealed. 
63-30-29.5. Liability insurance — Government 
vehicles operated by employees out-
side scope of employment. 
63-30-30. Repealed. 
63-30-31. ' Liability insurance — Construction of 
policy not in compliance with act. 
63-30-32. Liability insurance — Methods for 
purchase or renewal. 
63-30-33. Liability insurance —- Insurance for 
employees authorized — No right to 
indemnification or contribution 
from governmental agency. 
63-30-34. Limitation of judgments against gov-
ernmental entity or employee — In-
surance coverage exception. 
63-30-35. Expenses of attorney general, general 
counsel for state judiciary, and gen-
eral counsel for the Legislature in 
representing the state, its branches, 
members, or employees. 
63-30-36. Defending government employee — 
Request — Cooperation — Payment 
of judgment. 
63-30-37. Recovery of judgment paid and de-
fense costs by government em-
ployee. 
63-30-38. Indemnification of governmental en-
tity by employee not required. 
63-30-1. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the 
"Utah Governmental Immunity Act." 1965 
63-30-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action 
for money or damages against a governmental 
entity or against an employee. 
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental 
entity's officers, employees, servants, 
trustees, commissioners, members of a gov-
erning body, members of a board, members 
of a commission, or members of an advisory 
body, officers and employees in accordance 
with Section 62A-4-603, student teachers 
certificated in accordance with Section 
53A-6-101, educational aides, students en-
gaged in providing services to members of 
the public in the course of an approved medi-
cal, nursing, or other professional health 
care clinical training program, volunteers, 
and tutors, but does not include an indepen-
dent contractor. 
(b) "Employee" includes all of the posi-
tions identified in Subsection (2)(a), whether 
or not the individual holding that position 
receives compensation. 
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state 
and its political subdivisions as defined in this 
chapter., 
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any 
act, failure to act, operation, function, or un-
dertaking of a governmental entity whether 
or not the act, failure to act, operation, func-
tion, or undertaking is characterized as gov-
ernmental, proprietary, a core governmental 
function, unique to government, undertaken 
in a dual capacity, essential to or not essen-
tial to a government or governmental func-
tion, or could be performed by private enter-
prise or private persons. 
(b) A "governmental function" may be 
performed by any department, agency, em-
ployee, agent, or officer of a governmental 
entity. 
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, 
damage to or loss of property, or any other injury 
that a person may suffer to his person, or estate, 
that would be actionable if inflicted by a private 
person or his agent. 
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any 
kind other than property damage. 
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, 
city, town, school district, public transit district, 
redevelopment agency, special improvement or 
taxing district, or other governmental subdivi-
sion or public corporation. 
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss 
of, any right, title, estate, or interest in real or 
personal property. 
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and in-
cludes any office, department, agency, authority, 
commission, board, institution, hospital, college, 
university, or other instrumentality of the state. 
1991 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities 
from suit. 
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
chapter, all governmental entities are immune from 
suit for any injury which results from the exercise of 
a governmental function, governmentally-owned hos-
pital, nursing home, or other governmental health 
care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, 
or other professional health care clinical training pro-
gram conducted in either public or private facilities. 
(2) (a) For the purposes of this chapter only, the 
following state medical programs and services 
performed at a state-owned university hospital 
are unique or essential to the core of governmen-
tal activity in this state and are considered to be 
governmental functions: 
(i) care of a patient referred by another 
hospital or physician because of the high risk 
nature of the patient's medical condition; 
(ii) high risk care or procedures available 
in Utah only at a state-owned university 
hospital or provided in Utah only by physi-
cians employed at a state-owned university 
acting in the scope of their employment; 
(iii) care of patients who cannot receive 
appropriate medical care or treatment at an-
other medical facility in Utah; and 
(iv) any other service or procedure per-
formed at a state-owned university hospital 
or by physicians employed at a state-owned 
university acting in the scope of their em-
ployment that a court finds is unique or es-
sential to the core of governmental activity 
in this state, 
(b) If any claim under this subsection exceeds 
the limits established in Section 63-30-34, the 
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claimant may submit the excess claim to the 
Board of Examiners and the Legislature under 
Title 63, Chapter 6. 
(3) The management of flood waters and other nat-
ural disasters and the construction, repair, and opera-
tion of flood and storm systems by governmental enti-
ties are considered to be governmental functions, and 
governmental entities and their officers and em-
ployees are immune from suit for any injury or dam-
age resulting from those activities. 
(4) Officers and employees of a Children's Justice 
Center are immune from suit for any injury which 
results from their joint intergovernmental functions 
at a center created in Title 62A, Chapter 4. 1991 
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admis-
sion or denial of liability — Effect of 
waiver of immunity — Exclusive rem-
edy — Joinder of employee — Limita-
tions on personal liability. 
(1) (a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless 
specifically provided, may be construed as an ad-
mission or denial of liability or responsibility by 
or for governmental entities or their employees. 
(h) If immunity from suit is waived by this 
chapter, consent to be sued is granted, and liabil-
ity of the entity shall be determined as if the 
entity were a private person. 
(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is 
created by any waiver of immunity in this chap-
ter, nor may any provision of this chapter be con-
strued as imposing strict liability or absolute lia-
bility. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed as 
adversely affecting any immunity from suit that a 
governmental entity or employee may otherwise as-
sert under state or federal law. 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), an ac-
tion under this chapter against a governmental 
entity or its employee for an injury caused by an 
act or omission that occurs during the perfor-
mance of the employee's duties, within the scope 
of employment, or under color of authority is a 
plaintiffs exclusive remedy. 
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any 
other civil action or proceeding based upon the 
same subject matter against the employee or the 
estate of the employee whose act or omission 
gave rise to the claim, unless: 
(i) the employee acted or failed to act 
through fraud or malice; or 
(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the 
conditions set forth in Subsection 63-30-
36(3)(c). 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against 
a governmental entity in a representative capacity if 
the act or omission complained of is one for which the 
governmental entity may be liable, but no employee 
may be held personally liable for acts or omissions 
occurring during the performance of the employee's 
duties, within the scope of employment, or under 
color of authority, unless it is established that the 
employee acted or failed to tut due to fraud or malice. 
1991 
63-30-5. Waiver of immunity as to contractual 
obligations. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental enti-
ties is waived as to any contractual obligation. Ac-
tions arising out of contractual rights or obligations 
shall not be subject to the requirements of Sections 
63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 
63-30-19. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the Division of 
Water Resources is not liable for failure to deliver 
water from a reservoir or associated facility autho-
rized by Title 73, Chapter 26, Bear River Develop-
ment Act, if the failure to deliver the contractual 
amount of water is due to drought, other natural con-
dition, or safety condition tha t causes a deficiency in 
the amount of available water. 1991 
63-30-6. Waiver of immunity as to act ions in-
volving property. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entit ies is 
waived for the recovery of any property real or per-
sonal or for the possession thereof or to quiet title 
thereto, or to foreclose mortgages or other liens 
thereon or to determine any adverse claim thereon, or 
secure any adjudication touching any mortgage or 
other lien said entity may have or claim on the prop-
erty involved. 1965 
63-30-7. Repealed. 1991 
63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused 
by defective, unsafe, or dangerous con-
dition of h ighways , bridges, or other 
structures. 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the 
exceptions to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10, 
immunity from suit of all governmental entit ies is 
waived for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, 
or dangerous condition of any highway, road, street, 
alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel , bridge, 
viaduct, or other structure located on them. 1991 
63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from 
dangerous or defective public build-
ing, structure, or other public improve-
ment — Exception. 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the 
exceptions to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10, 
immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for any injury caused from a dangerous or 
defective condition of any public building, structure, 
dam, reservoir, or other public improvement. 1991 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused 
by negl igent act or omiss ion of em-
ployee — Except ions . 
Immunity from suit of all governmental enti t ies is 
waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent 
act or omission of an employee committed within the 
scope of employment except if the injury arises out of: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure 
to exercise or perform a discretionary function, 
whether or not the discretion is abused; 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false 
arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional tres-
pass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, in-
terference with contract rights, infliction of men-
tal anguish, or violation of civil rights; 
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revoca-
tion of or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, 
suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certifi-
cate, approval, order, or similar authorization; 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by mak-
ing an inadequate or negligent inspection; 
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judi-
cial or administrative proceeding, even if mali-
cious or without probable cause; 
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee 
whether or not it is negligent or intentional; 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
63-30-10.5 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 656 
(7) or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, 
public demonstrations, mob violence, and civil 
disturbances; 
(8) or in connection with the collection of and 
assessment of taxes; 
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(10) the incarceration of any person in any 
state prison, county or city jail, or other place of 
legal confinement; 
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned 
or controlled lands, any condition existing in con-
nection with an abandoned mine or mining oper-
ation, or any activity authorized by the Board of 
State Lands and Forestry; 
(12) research or implementation of cloud man-
agement or seeding for the clearing of fog; 
(13) the management of flood waters, earth-
quakes, or natural disasters; 
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of 
flood or storm systems; 
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, 
while being driven in accordance with the re-
quirements of Section 41-6-14; 
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective con-
dition of any highway, road, street, alley, cross-
walk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, 
or other structure located on them; 
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective con-
dition of any public building, structure, dam, res-
ervoir, or other public improvement; or 
(18) the activities of: 
(a) providing emergency medical assis-
tance; 
(b) fighting fire; 
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling 
hazardous materials or hazardous wastes; 
(d) emergency evacuations; or 
(e) intervening during dam emergencies. 
1091 
63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity for taking pri-
vate property without compensation. 
(1) As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution, immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for the recovery of compensation 
from the governmental entity when the governmen-
tal entity has taken or damaged private property for 
public uses without just compensation. 
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed 
according to the requirements of Title 78, Chapter 34, 
Eminent Domain. 1991 
63-30-10.6. Attorneys* fees for records requests. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental enti-
ties is waived for recovery of attorneys' fees under 
Sections 63-2-405 and 63-2-802. 
Notwithstanding Section 63-30-11: 
(a) a notice of claim for attorneys' fees under 
Subsection (1) may be filed contemporaneously 
with a petition for review under Section 
63-2-404; and 
(b) Sections 63-30-14 and 63-30-19 shall not 
apply. 
(2) Any other claim under this chapter that is re-
lated to a claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection 
(1) may be brought contemporaneously with the 
claim for attorneys' fees or in a subsequent action. 
1992 
63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents 
— Service — Legal disability. 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations 
that would apply if the claim were against a private 
person begins to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a 
governmental entity, or against an employee for an 
act or omission occurring during the performance of 
his duties, within the scope of employment, or under 
color of authority shall file a written notice of claim 
with the entity before maintaining an action, regard-
less of whether or not the function giving rise to the 
claim is characterized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant 
so far as they are known, 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim 
or that person's agent, attorney, parent, or 
legal guardian; and 
(ii) directed and delivered to the responsi-
ble governmental entity according to the re-
quirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, 
or mentally incompetent and without a legal 
guardian at the time the claim arises, the claim-
ant may apply to the court to extend the time for 
service of notice of claim. 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the govern-
mental entity, the court may extend the time 
for service of notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension 
that exceeds the applicable statute of limita-
tions. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an 
extension, the court shall consider whether the 
delay in serving the notice of claim will substan-
tially prejudice the governmental entity in main-
taining its defense on the merits. 1991 
63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee — 
Time for filing notice. 
A claim against the state, or against its employee 
for an act or omission occurring during the perfor-
mance of his duties, within the scope of employment, 
or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of 
claim is filed with the attorney general and the 
agency concerned within one year after the claim 
arises, or before the expiration of any extension of 
time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of 
whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 1987 
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or 
its employee — Time for filing notice. 
A claim against a political subdivision, or against 
its employee for an act or omission occurring during 
the performance of his duties, within the scope of em-
ployment, or under color of authority, is barred un-
less notice of claim is filed with the governing body of 
the political subdivision within one year after the 
claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension 
of time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of 
whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 1987 
63-30-14. Claim for injury — Approval or denial 
by governmental entity or insurance 
carrier within ninety days. 
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the gov-
ernmental entity or its insurance carrier shall act 
thereon and notify the claimant in writing of its ap-
proval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to have 
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been denied if at the end of the ninety-day period the 
governmental entity or its insurance carrier has 
failed to approve or deny the claim. 1965 
63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury — Authority 
and time for filing action against gov-
ernmental entity. 
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute 
an action in the district court against the governmen-
tal entity or an employee of the entily. 
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one 
year after denial of the claim or within one year after 
the denial period specified in this chapter has ex-
pired, regardless of whether or not the function giv-
ing rise to the claim is characterized as governmen-
tal. 1987 
63-30-16. Jurisdiction of district courts over ac-
tions — Application of Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The district courts shall have exclusive original ju-
risdiction over any action brought under this chapter, 
and such actions shall be governed by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure in so far as they are consistent 
with this chapter. 1983 
63-30-17. Venue of actions. 
Actions against the state may be brought in the 
county in which the claim arose or in Salt Lake 
County. Actions against a county may be brought in 
the county in which the claim arose, or in the defen-
dant county, or, upon leave granted by a district court 
judge of the defendant county, in any county contigu-
ous to the defendant county. Leave may be granted ex 
parte. Actions against all other political subdivisions 
including cities and towns, shall be brought in the 
county in which the political subdivision is located or 
in the county in which the claim arose. 1983 
63-30-18. Compromise and settlement of ac-
tions. 
(1) A political subdivision, after conferring with its 
legal officer or c> ser legal counsel if it does not have a 
legal officer, nr compromise and settle any action 
as to the damans or other relief sought. 
(2) The risk manager in the Department of Admin-
istrative Services may: 
(a) compromise and settle any claim of $25,000 
or less in damages filed against the state for 
which the Risk Management Fund may be liable; 
and 
(b) with the concurrence of the attorney gen-
eral or his representative and the executive di-
rector of the Department of Administrative Ser-
vices, compromise and settle any claim of more 
than $25,000 in damages for which the Risk 
Management Fund may be liable. 1990 
63-30-19. Undertaking required of plaintiff in 
action. 
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff shall 
file an undertaking in a sum fixed by the court, but in 
no case less than the sum of $300, conditioned upon 
payment by the plaintiff of taxable costs incurred by 
the governmental entity in the action if the plaintiff 
fails to prosecute the action or fails to recover judg-
ment. 1965 
63-30-20. Judgment against governmental en-
tity bars action against employee. 
Judgment against a governmental entity in an ac-
tion brought under this act shall constitute a com-
plete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of 
the same subject matter, against the employee whose 
act or omission gave rise to the claim. 1965 
63-30-21. Repealed. 1978 
63-30-22. Exemplary or punitive damages pro-
hibited — Governmental entity exempt 
from execution, attachment, or gar-
nishment. 
(1) (a) No judgment may be rendered against the 
governmental entity for exemplary or punitive 
damages. 
(b) The state shall pay any judgment or por-
tion of any judgment entered against a state em-
ployee in the employee's personal capacity even if 
the judgment is for or includes exemplary or pu-
nitive damages if the state would be required to 
pay the judgment under Section 63-30-36 or 
63-30-37. 
(2) Execution, attachment, or garnishment may 
not issue against a governmental entity. 1991 
63-30-23. Payment of claim or judgment against 
state — Presentment for payment. 
Any claim approved by the state as defined by Sub-
section 63-30-2(1) or any final judgment obtained 
against the state shall be presented to the state risk 
manager, or to the office, agency, institution or other 
instrumentality involved for payment, if payment by 
said instrumentality is otherwise permitted by law. If 
such payment is not authorized by law then said judg-
ment or claim shall be presented to the board of ex-
aminers and the board shall proceed as provided in 
Section 63-6-10. 1987 
63-30-24. Payment of claim or judgment against 
political subdivision — Procedure by 
governing body. 
Any claim approved by a political subdivision or 
any final judgment obtained against a political subdi-
vision shall be submitted to the governing body 
thereof to be paid forthwith from the general funds of 
said political subdivision unless said funds are appro-
priated to some other use or restricted by law or con-
tract for other purposes. 1965 
63-30-25. Payment of claim or judgment against 
political subdivision — Installment 
payments. 
If the subdivision is unable to pay the claim or 
award during the current fiscal year it may pay the 
claim or award in not more than ten ensuing annual 
installments of equal size or in such other install-
ments as are agreeable to the claimant. 1965 
63-30-26. Reserve funds for payment of claims 
or purchase of insurance created by 
political subdivisions. 
Any political subdivision may create and maintain 
a reserve fund or may jointly with one or more other 
political subdivisions make contributions to a joint 
reserve fund, for the purpose of making payment of 
claims against the co-operating subdivisions when 
they become payable pursuant to this chapter, or for 
the purpose of purchasing liability insurance to pro-
tect the co-operating subdivisions from any or all 
risks created by this chapter. 1983 
63-30-27. Tax levy by political subdivisions for 
payment of claims, judgments, or in-
surance premiums. 
(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the 
contrary, all political subdivisions may levy an an-
nual property tax sufficient to pay the following: 
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(a) any claim; 
(b) any settlement; 
(c) any judgment, including any judgment 
against an elected official or employee of any po-
litical subdivision, including peace officers, based 
upon a claim for punitive damages but the au-
thority of a political subdivision for the payment 
of any judgment for punitive damages is limited 
in any individual case to $10,000; 
(d) the costs to defend against any claim, set-
tlement, or judgment; or 
(e) the establishment and maintenance of a re-
serve fund for the payment of claims, settle-
ments, or judgments as may be reasonably antici-
pated. 
(2) It is legislative intent that the payments autho-
rized for punitive damage judgments or to pay the 
premium for such insurance as authorized is money 
spent for a public purpose within the meaning of this 
section and Article XIII, Sec. 5, Utah Constitution, 
even though as a result of the levy the maximum levy 
as otherwise restricted by law is exceeded. No levy 
under this section may exceed .0001 per dollar of tax-
able value of taxable property. The revenues derived 
from this levy may not be used for any other purpose 
than those stipulated in this section. 1988 
63-30-28. Liability insurance — Purchase of in-
surance or self-insurance by govern-
mental entity authorized — Establish-
ment of trust accounts for self-insur-
ance. 
(1) Any governmental entity within the state may 
purchase commercial insurance, self-insure, or self-
insure and purchase excess commercial insurance in 
excess of the statutory limits of this chapter against 
any risk created or recognized by this chapter or any 
action for v.hir'i a governmental entity or its em-
ployee may be held liable. 
(2) (a) In add lion to any other reasonable means 
of self-insuntnce, a governmental entity may 
self-insure with respect to specified classes of 
claims by establishing a trust account under the 
management of an independent private trustee 
having authority with respect to claims of that 
character to expend both principal and earnings 
of the trust account solely to pay the costs of in-
vestigation, discovery, and other pretrial and liti-
gation expenses including attorneys' fees, and to 
pay all sums for which the governmental entity 
may be adjudged liable or for which a compro-
mise settlement may be agreed upon. 
(b) The monies and interest earned on said 
trust fund shall be subject to investment pursu-
ant to Title 51, Chapter 7, State Money Manage-
ment Act of 1974, and shall be subject to audit by 
the state auditor. 
(3) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the 
trust agreement between the governmental entity 
and the trustee may authorize the trustee to employ 
counsel to defend actions against the entity and its 
employees and to protect and safeguard the assets of 
the trust, to provide for claims investigation and ad-
justment services, to employ expert witnesses and 
consultants, and to provide such other services and 
functions necessary and proper to carry out the pur-
poses of the trust. 1991 
63-30-29. Repealed. 1983 
63-30-29.5. Liability insurance — Government 
vehicles operated by employees out-
side scope of employment. 
A governmental entity that owns vehicles driven 
by employees of the governmental entity with the 
express or implied consent of the entity, but which, at 
the time liability is incurred as a result of an automo-
bile accident, is not being driven and used within the 
course and scope of the driver's employment is consid-
ered to provide the driver with the insurance cover-
age required by Title 41, Chapter 12a. However, the 
liability coverages considered provided are the mini-
mum limits under Section 31A-22-304. 1985 
63-30-30. Repealed. 1978 
63-30-31. Liability insurance — Construction of 
policy not in compliance with act. 
Any insurance policy, rider or endorsement hereaf-
ter issued and purchased to insure against any risk 
which may arise as a result of the application of this 
chapter, which contains any condition or provision 
not in compliance with the requirements of the chap-
ter, shall not be rendered invalid thereby, but shall 
be construed and applied in accordance with such 
conditions and provisions as would have applied had 
such policy, rider or endorsement been in full compli-
ance with this chapter, provided the policy is other-
wise valid. 1983 
63-30-32. Liabil i ty i n s u r a n c e —- M e t h o d s for 
purchase or renewal. 
No contract or policy of insurance may be pur-
chased or renewed under this chapter except upon 
public bid to be let to the lowest and best bidder; 
except that the purchase or renewal of insurance by 
the state shall be conducted in accordance with the 
provisions of Sections 63-56-1 through 63-56-73. 1983 
63-30-33. Liability insurance — Insurance for 
employees authorized — No right to in-
demnification or contribution from 
governmental agency. 
(1) (a) A governmental entity may insure any or 
all of its employees against liability, in whole or 
in part, for injury or damage resulting from an 
act or omission occurring during the performance 
of an employee's duties, within the scope of em-
ployment, or under color of authority, regardless 
of whether or not that entity is immune from suit 
for that act or omission. 
(b) Any expenditure for that insurance is for a 
public purpose. 
(c) Under any contract or policy of insurance 
providing coverage on behalf of a governmental 
entity or employee for any liability defined by 
this section, regardless of the source of funding 
for the coverage, the insurer has no right to in-
demnification or contribution from the govern-
mental entity or its employee for any loss or lia-
bility covered by the contract or policy. 
(2) Any surety covering a governmental entity or 
its employee under any faithful performance surety 
bond has no right to indemnification or contribution 
from the governmental entity or its employee for any 
loss covered by that bond based on any act or omis-
sion for which the governmental entity would be obli-
gated to defend or indemnify under the provisions of 
Section 63-30-36. 1991 
63-30-34. Limitation of judgments against gov-
ernmental entity or employee — Insur-
ance coverage exception. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2), if a 
judgment for damages for personal injury against 
a governmental entity, or an employee whom a 
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governmental entity has a duty to indemnify, ex-
ceeds $250,000 for one person in any one occur-
rence, or $500,000 for two or more persons in any 
one occurrence, the court shall reduce the judg-
ment to that amount. 
(b) A court may not award judgment of more 
than $250,000 for injury or death to one person 
regardless of whether or not the function giving 
rise to the injury is characterized as governmen-
tal. 
(c) Except as provided in Subsection (2), if a 
judgment for property damage against a govern-
mental entity, or an employee whom a govern-
mental entity has a duty to indemnify, exceeds 
$100,000 in any one occurrence, the court shall 
reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless 
of whether or not the function giving rise to the 
damage is characterized as governmental. 
(2) The damage limits established in this section 
do not apply to damages awarded as compensation 
when a governmental entity has taken or damaged 
private property for public use without just compen-
sation. 1091 
63-30-35. Expenses of attorney general, general 
counsel for state judiciary, and general 
counsel for the Legislature in repre-
senting the state, its branches, mem-
bers, or employees. 
(1) (a) After consultation with appropriate state 
agencies, the state risk manager shall provide a 
comprehensive liability plan, with limits not 
lower than those set forth in Section 63-30-34, 
that will protect the state and its indemnified 
employees from claims and liability. 
(b) The risk manager shall establish deduct-
ibles and maximum limits of coverage in consul-
tation with the executive director of the Depart-
ment of Administrative Services. 
(2) (a) The Office of the Attorney General has pri-
mary responsibility to provide legal representa-
tion to the judicial, executive, and legislative 
branches of state government in cases where 
Risk Management Fund coverage applies. 
(b) When the attorney general has primary re-
sponsibility to provide legal representation to the 
judicial or legislative branches, the attorney gen-
eral shall consult with the general counsel for 
the state judiciary and with the general counsel 
for the Legislature, to solicit their assistance in 
defending thru respective branch, and in deter-
mining strategy and making decisions concern-
ing the disposition of those claims. The decision 
for settlement of monetary claims in those cases, 
however, lies with the attorney general and the 
state risk manager. 
(3) (a) If the Judicial Council, after consultation 
with the general counsel for the state judiciary, 
determines that the Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral cannot adequately defend the state judi-
ciary, its members, or employees because of a 
conflict of interest, separation of powers con-
cerns, or other political or legal differences, the 
Judicial Council may direct its general counsel to 
separately represent and defend it. 
(b) If the general counsel for the state judi-
ciary undertakes independent legal representa-
tion of the state judiciary, its members, or em-
ployees, the general counsel shall notify the state 
risk manager and the attorney general in writing 
before undertaking that representation. 
(c) If the state judiciary elects to be repre-
sented by its own counsel under this section, the 
decision for settlement of claims against the state 
judiciary, its members, or employees, where Risk 
Management Fund coverage applies, lies with 
the general counsel for the state judiciary and 
the state risk manager. 
(4) (a) If the Legislative Management Committee, 
after consultation with general counsel for the 
Legislature, determines that the Office of the At-
torney General cannot adequately defend the leg-
islative branch, its members, or employees be-
cause of a conflict of interest, separation of 
powers concerns, or other political or legal differ-
ences, the Legislative Management Committee 
may direct its general counsel to separately rep-
resent and defend it. 
(b) If the general counsel for the Legislature 
undertakes independent legal representation of 
the Legislature, its members, or employees, the 
general counsel shall notify the state risk man-
ager and the attorney general in writing before 
undertaking that representation. 
(c) If the legislative branch elects to be repre-
sented by its own counsel under this section, the 
decision for settlement of claims against the leg-
islative branch, its members, or employees, 
where Risk Management Fund coverage applies, 
lies with the general counsel for the Legislature 
and the state risk manager. 
(5) (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 
67-5-3 or any other provision of this code, the 
attorney general, the general counsel for the 
state judiciary, and the general counsel for the 
Legislature may bill the Department of Adminis-
trative Services for all costs and legal fees ex-
pended by their respective offices, including at-
torneys' and secretarial salaries, in representing 
the state or any indemnified employee against 
any claim for which the Risk Management Fund 
may be liable and in advising state agencies and 
employees regarding any of those claims. 
(b) The risk manager shall draw funds from 
the Risk Management Fund for this purpose. 
1990 
63-30-36. Defending government employee — 
Request — Cooperation — Payment of 
judgment. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), a 
governmental entity shall defend any action brought 
against its employee arising from an act or omission 
occurring: 
(a) during the performance of the employee's 
duties; 
(b) within the scope of the employee's employ-
ment; or 
(c) under color of authority. 
(2) (a) Before a governmental entity may defend 
its employee against a claim, the employee shall 
make a written request to the governmental en-
tity to defend him: 
(i) within ten days after service of process 
upon him; or 
(ii) within a longer period that would not 
prejudice the governmental entity in main-
taining a defense on his behalf; or 
(iii) within a period that would not con-
flict with notice requirements imposed on 
the entity in connection with insurance car-
ried by the entity relating to the risk in-
volved. 
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(b) If the employee fails to make a request, or 
fails to reasonably cooperate in the defense, the 
governmental entity need not defend or continue 
to defend the employee, nor pay any judgment, 
compromise, or settlement against the employee 
in respect to the claim. 
(3) The governmental entity may decline to defend, 
or subject to any court rule or order, decline to con-
tinue to defend, an action against an employee if it 
determines: 
(a) that the act or omission in question did not 
occur: 
(i) during the performance of the em-
ployee's duties; 
(ii) within the scope of his employment; or 
(iii) under color of authority; 
(b) that the injury or damage resulted from the 
frau'l or malice of the employee; or 
(c) that the injury or damage on which the 
claim was based resulted from: 
(i) the employee driving a vehicle, or be-
ing in actual physical control of a vehicle: 
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal 
to or greater by weight than the estab-
lished legal limit; 
(B) while under the influence of alco-
hol or any drug to a degree that ren-
dered the person incapable of safely 
driving the vehicle; or 
(C) while under the combined influ-
ence of alcohol and any drug to a degree 
that rendered the person incapable of 
safely driving the vehicle; or 
(ii) the employee being physically or men-
tally impaired so as to be unable to reason-
ably perform his job function because of the 
uro of alcohol, because of the nonprescribed 
use of a controlled substance as defined in 
Section 58-37-4, or because of the combined 
influence of alcohol and a nonprescribed con-
trolled substance as defined by Section 
58-37-4. 
(4) (a) Within ten days of receiving a written re-
quest to defend an employee, the governmental 
entity shall inform the employee whether or not 
it shall provide a defense, and, if it refuses to 
provide a defense, the basis for its refusal. 
(b) A refusal by the entity to provide a defense 
is not admissible for any purpose in the action in 
which the employee is a defendant. 
(5) Except as provided in Subsection (6), if a gov-
ernmental entity conducts the defense of an em-
ployee, the governmental entity shall pay any judg-
ment based upon the claim. 
(6) A governmental entity may conduct the defense 
of an employee under a reservation of rights under 
which the governmental entity reserves the right not 
to pay a judgment, if the conditions set forth in Sub-
section (3) are established. 
(7) (a) Nothing in this section or Section 63-30-37 
affects the obligation of a governmental entity to 
provide insurance coverage according to the re-
quirements of Subsection 41-12a-301(3) and Sec-
tion 63-30-29.5. 
(b) When a governmental entity declines to de-
fend, or declines to continue to defend, an action 
against its employee under the conditions set 
forth in Subsection (3), it shall still provide cov-
erage up to the amount specified in Sections 
31A-22-304 and 63-30-29.5. 1991 
63-30-37. Recovery of judgment paid and de-
fense costs by government employee. 
(1) Subject to Subsection (2), if an employee pays a 
judgment entered against him, or any portion of it, 
which the governmental entity is required to pay un-
der Section 63-30-36, the employee may recover from 
the governmental entity the amount of the payment 
and the reasonable costs incurred in his defense. 
(2) If a governmental entity does not conduct the 
defense of an employee against a claim, or conducts 
the defense under an agreement as provided in Sub-
section 63-30-36(6), the employee may recover from 
the governmental entity under Subsection (1) if: 
(a) the employee establishes that the act or 
omission upon which the judgment is based oc-
curred during the performance of his duties, 
within the scope of his employment, or under 
color of authority, and that he conducted the de-
fense in good faith; and 
(b) the governmental entity does not establish 
that the injury or damage resulted from: 
(i) the fraud or malice of the employee; 
(ii) the employee driving a vehicle, or be-
ing in actual physical control of a vehicle: 
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal 
to or greater by weight than the estab-
lished legal limit; 
(B) while under the influence of alco-
hol or any drug to a degree that ren-
dered the person incapable of safely 
driving the vehicle; 
(C) while under the combined influ-
ence of alcohol and any drug to a degree 
that rendered the person incapable of 
safely driving the vehicle; or 
(iii) the employee being physically or 
mentally impaired so as to be unable to rea-
sonably perform his job function because of 
the use of alcohol, because of the 
nonprescribed use of a controlled substance 
as defined in Section 58-37-4, or because of 
the combined use of alcohol and a 
nonprescribed controlled substance as de-
fined in Section 58-37-4. 1987 
63-30-38. Indemnification of governmental en-
tity by employee not required. 
If a governmental entity pays all or part of a judg-
ment based on or a compromise or settlement of a 
claim against the governmental entity or an em-
ployee, the employee may not be required to indem-
nify the governmental entity for the payment. 1983 
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DECLARATORY J U D G M E N T S * 
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Jurisdiction of district courts — Form — 
Effort. •> 
Rights, status, legal relations under in* 
struments or statutes may he deter* 
mined. 
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Supplemental relief. 
Trial of issues of fact. ; 
Costs. 
Parties.
 s 
Chapter to be liberally construed. 
"Person" defined. 
78-33-1. Jur isdic t ion of district courts — Form 
— Effect. 
The district courts within their respective jurisdic-
tions shall have power to declare rights, status, and 
other legal relations, whether or not further relief is 
or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be 
open to objection on the ground that a declaratory 
judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration 
may be either affirmative or negative in form and 
effect; and such declaration shall have the force and 
effect of a final judgment or decree. 1953 
78-33-2. Rights , s tatus , legal relat ions under in* 
s truments or s tatutes m a y be deter* 
mi nod. 
Any person interested under a deed, will or written 
contract, or whose rights, status or other legal rela-
tions are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, 
contract or franchise, may have determined any ques-
tion of construction or validity arising under the in-
strument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise 
and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other 
legal relations thereunder. 1953 
78-33-3. Contracts . 
A contract may be construed either before or after 
there has been a breach thereof. 1953 
78-33-4. Suit by fiduciary or representative. 
Any person interested as or through an executor, 
administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary, 
creditor, devisee, legatee, heir, next of kin, or cestui 
que trust, in the administration of a trust, or of the 
estate of a decedent, an infant, lunatic or insolvent, 
may have a declaration of rights or legal relations in 
respect thereto: 
(1) to ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, 
legatees, heirs, next of kin or others; or, 
(2) to direct the executors, administrators or 
trustees to do or abstain from doing any particu-
lar act in their fiduciary capacity; or, 
(3) to determine any question arising in the 
administration of the estate or trust, including 
questions of construction of wills and other writ-
ings. 1953 
78-33-5. Court's general p o w e r s . 
The enumeration in Sections 78-33-2, 78-33-3 and 
78-33-4 does not limit or restrict the exercise of the 
general powers conferred in Section 78-33-1 in any 
proceeding where declaratory relief is sought, in 
which a judgment or decree will terminate the contro-
versy or remove an uncei tainty. 1953 
78-33-6. Discret ion to deny dec laratory relief. 
The court may refuse to render or enter a declara-
tory judgment or decree where such judgment or de-
cree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the 
uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceed-
, ing. 1853 
78-33-7. Appea l s and rev iews . 
All orders, judgments and decrees under this chap-
ter may be reviewed as other orders, judgments and 
' decrees. 1063 
: 78-33-8. Supplemental relief. 
Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or 
decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper. 
- The application therefor shall be by petition to a 
court having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If the 
i; application is deemed sufficient, the court shall, on 
• reasonable no* ice, require any adverse party, whose 
rights have been adjudicated by the declaratory judg-
| ment or decree, to show cause why further relief 
J should not be granted forthwith. 1953 
> 78-33-9. Trial of i s sues of fact. 
When a proceeding under this chapter involves the 
determination of an issue of fact, such issue may be 
• tried and determined in the same manner as issues of 
fact are tried and determined in other civil actions in 
• the court in which the proceeding is pending. 1953 
78-33-10. Costs . 
• In any proceeding under this chapter the court may 
make such award of costs as may seem equitable and 
, just. 1953 
78-33-11. Part ies . 
When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall 
be made parties who have or claim any interest which 
would be affected by the declaration, and no declara-
tion shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties 
to the proceeding. In any proceeding which involves 
the validity of a municipal or county ordinance or 
franchise such municipality or county shall be made 
' 1 party, and shall be entitled to be heard, and if a 
:
. statute or state franchise or permit is alleged to be 
; invalid the attorney general $hall be served with a 
' copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard. 
* l»53 
78-33-12. Chapter to be l iberally construed . 
> This chapter is declared to be remedial; its purpose 
is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and 
\ insecurity with respect to rights, status and other le-
. gal relations; and is to be liberally construed and ad-
\ ministered. 1953 
78-33-13. "Person" def ined. 
The word "person" wherever used in this chapter, 
shall be construed to mean any person, partnership, 
joint Btock company, unincorporated association or 
society, or municipal or other corporation of any char-
acter whatsoever. 1953 
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Ru!e 14 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
TITLE 111. REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT 
OF ORDERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, 
AND COMMITTEES. 
Rule 14. Review of administrative orders: how 
obtained; intervention. 
<a) Petition for review of order; joint petition. 
When judicial review by the Supreme Court or the 
Court of Appeals is provided by statute of an order or 
decision of an administrative agency, board, commis-
sion, committee, or officer (hereinafter the term 
"agency" shall include agency, board, commission, 
committee, o: officer), a petition for review shall he 
filed with the clerk of the appellate court within the 
time prescribed by statute, or if there is no time pre-
scribed, then within 30 days after the date of the 
written decision or order. The term "petition for re-
view" includes a petition to enjoin, set aside, suspend, 
modify, or otherwise review a notice of appeal or a 
writ of certiorari. The petition shall specify the par-
ties seeking review and shall designate the respon-
dent(s) and the order or decision, or part thereof, to be 
reviewed. In each case, the agency shall be named 
respondent. The State of Utah shall be deemed a re-
spondent if so required by statute, even though not so 
designated in the petition. If two or more persons are 
entitled to petition for review of the same order and 
their interests are such as to make joinder practica-
ble, they may file a joint petition for review and may 
thereafter proceed as a single petitioner. 
(b) Statutory and docketing fees. At the time of 
filing any petition for review, the party obtaining the 
review shall pay to the clerk of the appellate court 
such filing fees as are established by law, and also the 
fee for docketing the appeal. The clerk shall not ac-
cept a petition for review unless the filing and docket-
ing fees are paid. 
(c) Service of petition. A copy of the petition for 
review shall be served by the petitioner on the named 
respondent(s), upon all other parties to the proceed-
ing before the agency, and upon the Attorney General 
of Utah, if the state is a party, in the manner pre-
scribed by Rule 3(e). The petitioner, at the time of 
filing the petition for review, shall also file with the 
clerk of the appellate court a certificate reflecting ser-
vice upon all parties to the agency proceeding who 
have been r-rved. 
(d) Intervention. Any person who seeks to inter-
vene in a proceeding under this rule shall serve upon 
all parties to the proceeding and upon all parties who 
participated before the agency, and file with the clerk 
of the appellate court a motirn for leave to intervene. 
The motion shall contain a < oncise statement of the 
interest of the moving part; and the grounds upon 
which intervention is sough . A motion for leave to 
intervene shall be filed within 40 days of the date on 
which the petition for review is filed. 
Rule 15. The record on review. 
(a) Composition of the record. The order sought 
to be reviewed, the findings or report on which it is 
based, the pleadings, and evidence before the agency 
shall constitute t ie record on review in proceedings 
to review the order of an agency. 
(b) Omissions from or misstatements in the 
record. If anything material to any party is omitted 
from the itvord or is misstated, the parties may at 
any time supply the omission or correct the misstate-
ment by stipulation, or the appellate court, upon mo-
tion or on its own initiative, may at any time direct 
that the omission or misstatement be corrected and, if 
552! 
1 
necessary, that a supplemental record be prepared^ 
and filed. ^ 
'» 
Rule 16. Filing of the record. •' 
(a) Agency to file; time for filing; notice of fil-
ing. The agency shall file the record with the clerk of 
the appellate court within 40 days after service upon 
it of the petition for review. The court may shorten or 
extend the time above prescribed. The clerk shall 
give notice to all parties of the date on which the 
record is filed. 
(b) Filing; what constitutes. The agency may file 
the entire record or such parts as the parties may 
designate by stipulation filed with the agency. The 
original papers in the agency proceeding or certified 
copies may be filed. Instead of filing the record or 
designated parts, the agency may file a certified list 
of all documents, transcripts of testimony, exhibits 
and other material comprising the record, or a list of 
such parts as the parties may designate. The filing of 
the certified list shall constitute filing of the record. 
The parties may stipulate that neither the record nor 
a certified list be filed with the court. The stipulation 
shall be filed with the clerk and the date of its filing 
shall be deemed the date on which the record is filed. 
If a certified list is filed, or if the parties designate 
only parts of the record for filing or stipulate that 
neither the record nor a certified list be filed, the 
agency shall retain the record. Upon request of the 
court or the request of a party, the record shall be 
transmitted to the court notwithstanding any prior 
stipulation. All parts of the record retained by the 
agency shall be a part of the record on review for all 
purposes. 
Rule 17. Stay pending review. 
Application for a stay of a decision or order of an 
agency pending direct review in the appellate court 
shall ordinarily be made in the first instance to the 
agency if the agency is authorized by law to grant a 
stay. If a motion for such relief is made to the appel-
late court, the motion shall show that application to 
the agency for the relief sought is not practicable, or 
that application has been made to the agency and 
denied, with the reasons given by it for denial. The 
motion shall also show the reasons for the relief re-
quested and the facts relied upon, and if the facts are 
subject to dispute, the motion shall be supported by 
affidavits or other sworn statements or copies thereof. 
With the motion shall be filed those parts of the 
record relevant to the relief sought. Reasonable no-
tice of the filing of the motion and any hearing shall 
be given to all parties to the proceeding in the appel-
late court. The appellate court may condition relief 
under this rule upon the filing of a bond or other 
appropriate security. The motion shall be filed with 
the clerk and normally will be considered by the 
court, but in exceptional cases where such procedure 
would be impracticable due to the requirements of 
time, the application may be considered by a single 
justice or judge of the court. 
Rule 18. Applicability of other rules to review. 
All provisions of these rules are applicable to re-
view of decisions or orders of agencies, except that 
Rules 3 through 8 and 11 through 13 are not applica-
ble. As used in any applicable rule, the term "appel-
lant" includes a petitioner in proceedings to review 
agency orders. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
